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Abstract 
This article focuses on the autobiographical ghost that dwells in “Envois” and the multiple 
ways he/she/it interferes in Derrida’s concept of écriture. Read through love letters sent 
as postcards with the image representing Socrates writing in front of Plato, Derrida’s writ-
ing, I argue, definitely becomes a cryptic writing (écriture cryptique) both in the sense of 
kryptô (Gr. coded) and secerno (Lat. set apart). I endeavor to show that “Envois”—largely 
autobiographical and entangled in his life events—is a harbinger of the secret that Derrida 
takes for a fundamental feature of democracy in his later works. And yet the secret is of 
his own, as he notes when writing “Envois”: “Nobody will never know what the secret 
I write along with is. And that I say this will not change anything” (Peeters, 2010, p. 367). 
Keywords: autobiography; love; crypt; secret; writing. 
  
At the moment I leave “my” book (to be published)—after all, no one forces me to do it—
I become, appearing-disappearing, like that uneducable specter who will have never learned 
how to live. The trace I leave signifies to me at once my death, either to come or already come 
upon me, and the hope that this trace survives me. This is not a striving for immortality; it’s 
something structural. I leave a piece of paper behind, I go away, I die: it is impossible to escape 
this structure, it is the unchanging form of my life. Each time I let something go, each time 
some trace leaves me, “proceeds” from me, unable to be reappropriated, I live my death in 
writing. (Derrida, 2007, pp. 32–33) 
When a philosopher confesses that he lives his death in writing, such a confession entails 
two problematic issues. He seems to admit that the immense philosophical writing he is 
widely known for might or even should be read as an autobiographical project. But, since 
death is “the always-already-there” (Derrida, 1989, p. 117) of his life, to quote the formula 
from Derrida’s first book, autobiography can only appear as a spectre that haunts his writ-
ing. Crudely speaking, a man who once lived and was named Jacques Derrida hovers over 
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the words he uses. Hence, his ghost also haunts those who refer to his philosophical con-
cepts: dissemination, trace, hauntology, survival [survie], animots, just to name a few. In 
the last interview, originally published in Le Monde three weeks before his death, Derrida 
says: “one has not yet begun to read me . . . even though there are, to be sure, many very 
good readers (a few dozen in the world perhaps, people who are also writer-thinkers, po-
ets)” (2007, p. 34). Then, how and where to begin from? To begin to read Derrida, I argue, 
means to familiarize oneself with his spectral presence that haunts Derridean philosophy. 
One of Derrida’s permanent obsessions might be rendered in these terms: my proper lan-
guage will have never belonged to me. It expropriates me every time I come to life through 
my writing. I am my own ghost. However, writing from within such a belief clearly neces-
sitates a methodical self-staging. This article particularly focuses on the presence of auto-
biographical ghosts that dwell in “Envois,” the first part of The Post Card: From Socrates 
to Freud and Beyond (Derrida, 1987). However, as it is a part of a larger research project 
on the relation between auto/biography and philosophy, I will start by describing the highly 
problematic status of auto/biography in philosophical discourse using Nietzsche as an ex-
ample. Indeed, auto/biography, I argue, may be seen as a ghost that haunts modern philos-
ophy, while a philosopher is not expected to directly refer to his life experience when doing 
philosophy.1 From this perspective, “Envois” is of particular relevance. Discussing Der-
rida’s text, I will follow three steps. First, choosing a biographical approach to “Envois,” 
I will focus on a love affair that seems to act as a trigger for Derrida’s écriture and largely 
responds to what he refers to as a secret. Then, working on Richard Rorty’s assumption that 
Derrida “is trying to create himself by creating his own language game” (1989, p. 133), 
I will discuss how his approach to love interferes in his fundamental concepts such as dif-
férance, trace and dissemination. Finally, I will endeavour to show that Derrida’s writing, 
performed by love letters sent as postcards and, as a result, challenging the distinction be-
tween the private and the public, becomes a cryptic writing [écriture cryptique]. It is both 
coded [krypto] and set apart [secerno]. Thus, unlike Rorty, who seems to highlight that 
“Envois” resists any procedure of reading, I will indicate a specific code in Derrida’s text. 
Using the notion of the crypt, I will show that Derrida’s love follows what Abraham and 
Torok refer to as “the cryptonymic procedure” (Abraham & Torok, 1986, p. 21).  
                                                          
1 My ongoing research on what I refer to as “auto/biographical philosophy” mainly concerns male philosophers 
(Bataille, Blanchot, Derrida, Nancy and Stiegler). The question about auto/biography in philosophy should be 
posed, I believe, with gender sensitivity and bearing in mind sexual difference. From a general perspective, 
I would be inclined to argue that the absence of auto/biography in philosophical discourse coincides with the ab-
sence of women in the history of philosophy, which results from women’s social and cultural condition. As long 
as the power of reasoning (and philosophizing) is defined as male, the question of bios (biography and biology) 
appears as female. In my research, however, I intend to go beyond this general perspective, paying attention to 
how particular and heterosexual male philosophers define, are determined by and refer to their masculinity in 
their writings and how they describe their relationships with women. It would be highly interesting and useful to 
apply this approach in relation to particular female philosophers to see not only how they come to philosophy 
as women and how they become women-philosophers, but also how they refer, if ever, to their femininity. Do 
they have the same strong will to write themselves through their philosophical projects as male philosophers do? 
From this perspective, Catherine Malabou’s philosophical project is of crucial interest in my research. 
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A reflection that has been with me for a while is that we simply ignore the biographies of 
philosophers as something external to their philosophy, whereas we are perfectly familiar 
with the biographies of writers or artists as something that might explain some fragments 
of their oeuvre. In fact, it is common knowledge that the life of a philosopher has nothing 
to do with his or her thought. We seem to be quite post-Romantic in our ways of thinking 
thought itself. Romanticizing thought, we somehow take it for granted that life in its con-
tingency does not affect it at all. As a result, detecting ties between life and thought when 
dealing with a philosopher would imply frivolous psychologizing of philosophical con-
cepts or seeing in the history of thought nothing but a sad reflection of personal affairs. It 
is as if the very right to auto/biography as an inherent part of the oeuvre was an effect of 
being (qualified as) a writer. It is as if, when dealing with a philosopher’s writing, our 
academic practices of analysis, for their seriousness’ sake, condemn as a matter of course 
and in the name of some invisible philosophical authority any kind of simplest questions 
that one could ask when thinking of writers: what were they like? What were they thinking 
about when they wrote this or that? What was the role of their significant others in their 
thought? If such questions appear as ill-chosen ones just because they target a philosopher 
and not a writer, one might see here the incontrovertible evidence of an interdiction that it 
would be interesting to investigate. 
Jacques Derrida often questioned the absence of auto/biography within philosophical dis-
course. When giving quite a spontaneous lecture at New York University in 1996, he 
pointed out that traditional philosophy defines biography as external to philosophy. When 
Heidegger, Derrida says, was asked: “What was the life of Aristotle?”, he replied: ‘He was 
born, thought and died.’ And all the rest is a pure anecdote” (Dick & Ziering Kofman, 
2005, p. 60). From this perspective, stepping into philosophy through auto/biography 
binds us to invoke ghosts and question an absence that is almost palpable. Heidegger him-
self, with his Schwarze Hefte, may be a salient example of this.  
Were we to believe that to philosophize, generally and particularly, simply and essentially, 
is to learn to live, which would ultimately mean to learn to die (Derrida, 2007, p. 24), it is 
striking that we are somehow taught, when learning to live, not to pay too much attention 
to the life experiences of our teachers. We learn how to live from those who are supposed 
not to have (had) their lives. And if they have one, we are willing to consider it a reflection 
of their philosophy and, as a result, to recognize their intellectual biography in which life 
becomes both understandable and relevant only when it stems from a philosophical doc-
trine. Materially speaking, the lived [le vécu] is not a lesson to be learned from. It gives 
way to the idea of life. However surprising it may seem, life as such may be seen as a 
ghost that haunts what Derrida refers to as “traditional” philosophy.  
And yet, “traditional” here seems to refer less to philosophy as an ensemble of texts that 
are at our disposal whenever we want to learn to live. It rather refers to what we want these 
texts to mean for us. Philosophy defined as “traditional” is, in fact, a strange way in which 
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we maintain that philosophy matters and overlook the material conditions of its produc-
tion as something immaterial to philosophy. The invisible ghost of autobiography that 
hovers over philosophy strangely has a material presence.  
Nietzsche is perhaps the first who made this ghost speak through philosophy so loudly. 
Certainly, in his autobiography Nietzsche writes: “I am one thing, my writings are another” 
(2007, p. 36), while in the preface to his most personal text he says: “But let us leave Mr 
Nietzsche: what is it to us that that Mr Nietzsche has got well again” (2001, p. 4). But both 
to Nietzsche and those who read his writings because they wish to learn to live and want to 
understand why he writes such good books, to recall the title of a chapter from his autobi-
ography, it seems that the simple fact that Nietzsche has got well again does matter:  
This book might need more than one preface; and in the end there still be room for doubting 
whether someone who has not experienced something similar could, by means of prefaces, be 
brought closer to the experiences of this book. It seems to be written in the language of the 
wind that brings a thaw: it contains high spirits, unrest, contradiction, and April weather, so 
that one is constantly reminded of winter’s nearness as well as of the triumph over winter that 
is coming, must come, perhaps has already come… Gratitude flows forth incessantly, as if 
that which was most unexpected had just happened—the gratitude of a convalescent—
for re⁠covery was what was most unexpected. “Gay Science”: this signifies the saturnalia of a 
mind that has patiently resisted a terrible, long pressure—patiently, severely, coldly, without 
yielding, but also without hope—and is now all of a sudden attacked by hope, by hope for 
health, by the intoxication of recovery. (Nietzsche, 2001, p. 3) 
Nietzsche philosophizes with gaiety because he has recovered. His science has been gay 
since his painful headaches unexpectedly stopped for a moment. The sickness of Europe, 
which he sees as “a patient who owes the utmost gratitude to his incurability and to the 
perpetual changes in his affliction” (2001, p. 49), is first his own.  
I do not claim that Nietzsche’s recovery is essential to understand his philosophical thought. 
I rather suggest that it is of the essence. It is both an example and exemplar of how a singular 
subject answers to, but also for and before the world, to exploit—in the wake of Derrida’s 
concept of responsibility (1992a, 2002)—the full range of meanings of the Latin verb 
re⁠spondere, through the way s/he experiences it. That this experience is first bodily and 
essentially material may matter for those of us who want to learn how to read and live. In 
fact, a lesson we can learn from Nietzsche’s gay science is that healthy experience gives 
birth to some enlightening ideas. Nietzsche’s fresh ideas about Europe sinking into what he 
refers to as nihilism, are an example. It would also explain that his general opinions about 
woman and sex, “often shallow and sometimes embarrassing, . . . were the product of an 
experience which had been drastically limited and disappointing” (Williams, 2001, p. xi).  
Deliberately materialist, an auto/biographical approach to philosophy I opt for here may be 
seen as a method of doing philosophy defined as learning to live, which makes it possible, 
however, to go beyond its general and idealistic presumptions, as long as the question of life 
is concerned. Putting special emphasis on the interplay between experiencing the world and 
conceptualizing it, this approach, I believe, also provides a helpful tool for critical read ⁠ing, 
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which ultimately enables us to see the light, i.e. to live/read well, which amount to liv-
ing/reading critically. My way of reading philosophy is that of a philologist who tries to see 
the sense of a singular oeuvre as a result of an experience that his/her author refers to more 
or less conspicuously. Perhaps, to a “traditional” philosopher, this materialist reading may 
be immaterial. But if the sense of philosophy still has to be about learning to live in a “post-
truth” world, it has to stem from a philological curiosity and an appetite for meaning.  
Ultimately, what philosophy means to us largely depends on what kind of questions we 
ask when reading in order to learn to live. In a documentary film about Derrida by Kirby 
Dick and Amy Ziering Kofman, an off-camera voice asks Derrida what he would like to 
learn from a documentary film about Heidegger, Hegel or Kant. After a longer moment 
of silence, Derrida—ill at ease, manifestly irritated but still determined—says that he 
would like to hear them speak of their sexual life. He also would like to know, as he adds, 
why they appear as asexual beings through their writings and why they wiped out their 
private life from their philosophy. From this perspective, to philosophize in order to learn 
to live entails asking straight and non-philosophical questions that require, however, 
mostly philosophical answers.  
Discussing auto/biography in the context of “Envois” involves asking not only whether a 
philosopher is entitled to write his autobiography and whether we are entitled to discuss 
his thought in relation to his life, but also whether a philosopher has the right to love. How 
does loving affect thinking? Can we be in love and think at the same time, given the fact 
that love, pragmatically speaking, is something we necessarily fall in? Derrida not only 
questions “traditional” philosophy that makes it somehow impossible, from a rhetorical 
point of view, to inscribe the autobiographical in the philosophical, but he also untiringly 
tries to invent an idiom that would bear his experience. In a personal note from 1976, 
quoted by his biographer, Derrida refers to the idea of a book that would transform what 
he calls his “approach to anecdote which is strangled, tense and repressed” (Peeters, 2010, 
p. 361). From now on, Derrida will refer to this project as “the impossible,” whenever his 
autobiographical ghost will appear in many of his texts, for example in Specters of Marx 
which opens with some kind of an avowal: “Someone, you or me, comes forward and 
says: I would like to learn to live finally” (Derrida, 1994, p. xvi).  
In this respect, “Envois” is of particular importance. On the one hand, Derrida writes the 
text when, so to speak, his autobiographical urge is at its peak: he is obsessed by an idea 
of a fully autobiographical book which is supposed to be different from what he has written 
so far. On the other hand, he writes “Envois” in order to give voice to his love, yet this 
love, as I will try to show, is supposed to remain secret and, as a result, has to be ciphered. 
In 1972 Derrida gives a lecture on Nietzsche, published later as Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles. 
He starts this lecture by recalling a letter sent by Nietzsche in 1872, which is rather loosely 
connected to his argument (he translates the letter and puts his comments in): 
From Basel in seventy two (The Birth of Tragedy) Nietzsche writes to Malvida von Mey-
senbug. . . . At last my little bundle (or the little envelope (pli): mein Bündelchen für Sie. Will 
it ever be revealed, what was thus named between them?) is ready for you, and at last you hear 
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from me, after it must have seemed that I had sunk into a dead silence (grabesschweigen). . . . 
You see, my Birth of Tragedy has made of me the most offensive [the most scabrous] philol-
ogist of the present day (der anstoßigste Philologe des Tages). (1979, pp. 34–35) 
Derrida continues in a rather nebulous way: “the title for this lecture was to have been the 
question of style. However—it is woman who will be my subject. Still, one might wonder 
whether that doesn’t really amount to the same thing—or is it to the other?” (pp. 35–37). 
Feminist interpretations of Derrida’s reading of Nietzsche point out that “Derrida’s anal-
ysis challenges the structural apparatus that sustains the reproduction of patriarchy. None-
theless, the style of Spurs clearly betrays its masculine signature, and thereby participates 
in this reproduction” (Feder & Zakin, 1997, p. 24). Putting aside the masculine character 
of Derrida’s signature, it has to be said that Nietzsche here is first of all a “transferential 
figure” (Derrida, 1992b, p. 364) through which Derrida seems to write/cipher his own 
“birth of tragedy.” Written between 1977 and 1979, “Envois” refers to his long and pas-
sionate love affair with Sylviane Agacinski. It begins in 1972 precisely and was tacitly 
accepted by Derrida’s wife and his intellectual entourage (Peeters, 2010, pp. 358–359). 
“A taste for the secret” (Derrida & Ferraris, 2002) Derrida would have recognized as his 
own stems, perhaps, from what has to be left unsaid, as if the secret had to be known and 
kept by everyone, which means that no one can actually reveal it.  
The air of a strange open secrecy that hovers over Derrida’s love affair gives us a better 
insight into what Derrida understands as love and how he ciphers his love by what legal 
English refers to as “unsealed writing.” An unsealed writing tells us that no special means 
are required to make a contract legally binding. Technically speaking, “Envois” are love 
letters that Derrida supposedly writes to his lover on a whole stock of the same postcard. 
Commenting on Derrida’s text, Richard Rorty says that “nothing is more private than a 
love letter—there is nothing to which general ideas are less relevant and more inappro-
pri⁠ate. Everything, in a love affair or in a love letter, shared private associations” (1989, 
p. 126). And yet, the most private becomes public, since what is written on a postcard can 
be read by anyone. “I resemble a messenger from antiquity, a bellboy, a runner, the courier 
of what we have given one another . . . and I run to bring them news which must remain 
secret, and I fall all the time” (Derrida, 1987, p. 8). Derrida’s love written in cipher illus-
trates his constant and obsessive question: how to save myself (how to save my love) using 
the only possible language (my proper language) that kills me whenever I open my mouth? 
Hence, the question is not about how to tell the secret, but just how to write the secret that 
becomes unspeakable once it takes the shape of words or sentences. Derrida writes as if 
he were the keeper of his own secret by untiringly trying to tell it. His singular idiom, but 
also what he often refers to as “unfaithful fidelity” or “the impossible,” comes from this 
secret that must be told to be kept and can never be revealed at the same time. This is why 
Derrida, as he writes, “fall[s] all the time” (1987, p. 8).  
And yet, a fall is not a sine qua non condition of love from a pragmatic perspective. Der⁠rida 
is fallen in love, but his fall is rather a way of reasoning through writing. If Derrida had 
been Flaubert, he might have said: “la différance, c’est moi.” In fact, the public secret his 
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love speaks through is a way of telling the différance he seems to embody and identify 
with. One may imagine Derrida speaking in these simplified terms: if you want to follow 
me and see my love, just love the différance, find me disseminated in my love letters. 
Love, as différance, “cannot be exposed . . . In every exposition it would be exposed to 
disappearing as disappearance. It would risk appearing: disappearing” (Derrida, 1982, 
pp. 5–6). Derrida in love is still the one who writes out his fundamental concept and mul-
tiplies his masks. Driven by a real love affair, love is also a result of philosophizing.  
As Richard Rorty points out, “anybody who has read a little of philosophy will get little 
from ‘Envois’” (1989, pp. 133–134). And yet, if we look at “the incredible richness of 
texture of ‘Envois’—a richness achieved by few other contemporary writers, and no other 
contemporary philosophy professors” (p. 129)—paying more attention to how Derrida de-
cides to tell his secret love, then “Envois” lets us understand better the autobiographical 
ghost that haunts his philosophy since his first writings. Telling his love, exposing to the 
public view what “cannot be exposed” (Derrida, 1982), Derrida certainly exposes himself. 
However, by his personal exposure and the way he combines “the privately erotic and the 
publicly philosophical” (Rorty, 1989, p. 127), he also exposes his own concepts.  
Derrida’s love may be seen as a key to the reinterpretation of his most recognized and 
apparently more philosophical texts. Suffice it to remember his comment on Phaedrus. In 
this Platonic dialogue Socrates holds a discussion with the young Phaedrus who reads the 
text of a sophist speech about love, delivered by Lysias. An exchange on love entails Der-
rida’s argument about the nature of writing that Socrates defines as pharmakon (Derrida, 
1981, pp. 61–171). Plato and Socrates make their unexpected return in “Envois.” The back 
of the postcard on which Derrida writes his love letters presents a reproduction of a medi-
eval illustration by Matthew Paris. It depicts Socrates who is writing and Plato who is 
standing behind. Confessing that “[he] still do[es] not know how to see what there is to 
see” (Derrida, 1987, p. 16), Derrida endlessly ponders on Paris’s illustration and gives the 
most astonishing interpretations of it through the letters he sends. Identifying with Nie-
tzsche, who describes himself in his letter to Malvida von Meysenbug as “the most offen-
sive [the most scabrous] philologist of the present day” (Derrida, 1979, pp. 34–35), 
Derrida also seems to identify his love with Paris’s illustration. He strangely becomes 
Plato from his own fantasy:  
for the moment, myself, I tell you I see Plato getting an erection in Socrates’ back and see the 
insane hubris of his prick, an interminable, disproportionate erection traversing Paris’s head 
like a single idea and then the copyist’s chair, before slowly sliding, still warm, under Socra-
tes’ right leg, in harmony or symphony with the movement of his phallus sheaf, the points, 
plumes, pens, fingers, nails, and grattoirs, the very pencil boxes which address themselves in 
the same direction. The di-rection, the dierection of this couple, these old nuts, these rascals 
on horseback, this is us. (Derrida, 1987, p. 18) 
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Telling love by unsealed writing, Derrida’s lips are definitely not to be sealed, while the 
secret is not to be hidden, but rather seems to be told in a cryptic language. By recalling 
the Hebrew meaning of the word “tongue” in the Tower of Babel story, Derrida refers this 
cryptic language to “one lip, one alone to say everything”:  
They wanted to elevate sublimely themselves, in order to impose their lip, the unique lip, on 
the universe. Babel, the father, giving his name of confusion, multiplied the lips and this is 
why we are separated and that right now I am dying, dying to kiss you with our lip the only 
one I want to hear. (1987, p. 9) 
If Derrida’s postal principle comes from the fact that “a letter can always not arrive at its 
destination” (1987, p. 33), his love principle, so to speak, simply comes from the act of 
writing. Derrida does not write to say je t’aime, even though he is in love. Je t’aime is 
replaced by je t’écris, which is meant to be understood as “I am writing to you” and “I am 
writing you” as well. To love is to write: “At every moment the order to write you is given, 
no matter what, but to write you, and I love, and this is how I recognize that I love” (1987, 
p. 10). To love is then not necessarily to love the other, but rather to dwell in/on the self 
and its own love. Saying “I love,” saying it again and again in a narcissistic suspense, has 
the edge over saying “I love you.” 
And when I call you my love, my love, is it you I am calling or my love? You, my love, is it 
you I thereby name, is it to you I address myself? I don’t know if the question is well put, it 
frightens me. But I am sure that the answer, if it gets to me one day, will have come to me 
from you. You alone, my love, you alone will have known it. . . .  
when I call you my love, is it that I am calling you, yourself, or is it that I am telling my 
love? and when I tell you my love, is it that I am declaring my love to you or indeed that I 
am telling you, yourself, my love, and that you are my love. I want so much to tell you. 
(Derrida, 1987, p. 8) 
When writing “Envois,” Derrida seems to have assimilated Sandor Ferenczi’s theory he 
became familiar with through Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok’s works. According to 
Ferenczi, quoted by Derrida in his preface to The Wolf Man’s Magic World, written in 
1976, “all object-love [is] an enlargement of the Self” (Derrida, 1986, p. xvi). Torok and 
Abraham’s reinterpretation of the Wolf Man’s diary largely determined Derrida’s ap-
proach to psychoanalysis and his reading of Freud and Lacan in the subsequent chapters 
of The Post Card. But it may have also fed lines to him when he was performing his love 
on philosophical stage. Derrida seems to be particularly seduced by the linguistic entan-
glement of the Wolf Man’s case as described by Freud. Abraham and Torok point out that 
Sergei Pankejeff’s personal story was predetermined by four languages. Russian, German, 
English and French words interacted with each other and created a specific verbarium that 
one cannot symbolize or refer to an extralinguistic event. The verbarium is a “crypt” that 
only hides words to be ciphered in a widely open and a fully available text. Words are 
given, yet they remain out of reach. They are full of phantoms, phonetic, rhyming and 
semantic fossils, while infinitely switching from one language to another. However, this 
“jigsaw puzzle” (Abraham & Torok, 1986, p. 80) does not lead to the hidden meaning 
which is somehow drowned in the unconscious as if it were buried into the crypt. Abraham 
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and Torok speak of “a false Unconsciousness” understood as “the crypt in the Ego—a 
false ‘return of the repressed,’ the action in the Ego of hidden thoughts from the crypt” 
(1986, p. lxxi). What is at stake here is not to provide sense, i.e. to say what the puzzle 
really means, once it has been assembled. It is rather about discovering the intersymbolic 
principle which is responsible for the production of cryptonyms with no intention to con-
clude whether they refer to what is real or imagined.  
When telling his love, Derrida speaks from within the crypt. He seems to create a specific 
love cryptogram in the wake of what he referred to as dissemination in his early writings. 
To become disseminated would be to “lose one’s head, no longer to know where one’s 
head is” (Derrida, 1981, p. 20). Thus, when Derrida says: on va pouvoir enfin s’aimer [we 
are finally going to love each other], it should be also understood as on va pouvoir semer 
[we are finally going to spread or disseminate]. Were we to play with homonymy that 
dissemination feeds on, we may say that a reader sews what Derrida sows through his text 
from within his crypt (Johnson, 1981, p. xix). However, such a reading is not about sewing 
Derrida up, stitching him together, but rather about sewing Derrida’s private crypt onto 
his philosophical concepts in order to better understand the link between his philosophy 
and autobiography. Derrida’s crypt is perhaps the most visible/hidden through the way he 
decides to sign his text by disseminating his name within his writing: 
I accept [j’accepte], this will be my signature henceforth, . . . take this word at its most literal, 
it is my name, that j’accepte, and you will be able to count, to count on it as on the capital 
clarities, from you I accept everything. (1987, p. 26) 
In j’accepte one is supposed to find Jacques and sept [seven] referring to the number of 
letters the name Derrida consists of (Bass, 1987, p. xiv). Derrida’s corpus is Derrida’s 
body [corps]. However, it would be hard to say that his writing is corporeal. Derrida does 
not write with or on his own body. He rather writes over his dead body. Singing his text, 
he accepts his death, yet the signature becomes the only possibility of an impossible life 
in his corpus—his second skin. For this reason Derrida’s love can only exist when enun-
ciating itself; it is both performative and self-centred.  
Accepting such a love seems to be rather challenging for the one who is supposed to be 
loved and somehow despairing for the one who loves. While the former can simply mis-
understand the words of love or find no trace of it in the letters she receives, the latter 
experiences his love as “a tragedy . . . of destination” (Derrida, 1987, p. 23):  
a tragedy, my love, of destination. Everything becomes a postcard once more, legible for the 
other, even if he understands nothing about it. And if he understands nothing, certain for the 
moment of the contrary, it might always arrive for you, for you too, to understand nothing, and 
therefore for me, and therefore not to arrive, I mean at its destination. (Derrida, 1987, p. 23) 
Derrida also notes: “You always accuse me of being ‘delirious,’ and you know very well, 
alas, what that means in our code” (1987, p. 17). Of course, no one knows the code that she 
is supposed to know. It is possible, however, to indicate a specific code of love in Derrida’s 
text. An attempt to decode it would entail leaving Derrida in his crypt and paying attention 
to his “love delirium” which may be seen as coessential with the language created by the 
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“original words” (Abraham & Torok, 1986, p. 83) from the Wolf Man’s crypt. Paradoxi-
cally, the crypt makes it possible to see “the truth” of love, yet this love is experienced as 
real and imagined or fantasized at the same time. A biographical approach to “Envois” 
cannot be thus limited to what really happened to Derrida, since he decides to immediately 
hide his love into the crypt. Loving in the crypt becomes a peculiar way of life through 
writing which skilfully plays with the truth, be it quite a sophisticated form of living a lie. 
In this respect, Derrida’s lecture on Nietzsche from 1972, where writing is identified with 
“a woman (truth) [who] will not be pinned down” (1979, pp. 55–57), gives us an insight 
into how Derrida likes to hide in his oeuvre: “a ‘woman’ takes so little interest in truth, 
because in fact she barely even believes in it, the truth, as regards her, does not concern her 
in the least” (1979, p. 63). Only from this perspective may his style be qualified as feminine, 
yet this perspective tells us nothing about women without inverted commas. This “woman” 
refers to no other than Derrida who tries to make his love speak through philosophy.  
In his famous Literary Theory Jonathan Culler, when explaining why a text can be defined 
as a literary text in our culture, provides us with a couplet from Robert Frost’s poem: “We 
dance round in a ring and suppose / But the Secret sits in the middle and knows” (1997, 
p. 22). Any attempt to reveal the secret of “Envois,” i.e. to take hold of the text, is certainly 
doomed to failure. In fact, as Rorty has it, “Envois” is a kind of prose “in which you can 
never tell, from line to line, whether you are supposed to pay attention to the ‘symbolic’ or 
the ‘material’ features of the words being used” (1989, p. 135). Does it then mean that 
“there is nothing propositional to be taken away from the experience of reading it” (Rorty, 
1989, p. 135)? I would not say so. In fact, if we pay more attention to the material conditions 
of Derrida’s writing and take account of his countless strategies of performing the self on 
philosophical stage, it becomes possible to find a specific code behind Derrida’s verbarium 
and, as a result, to decode Derrida’s cryptic love. However, it is not about trying to force 
his crypt in order to know the secret. It is rather about observing “the cryptonymic proce-
dure” (Abraham & Torok, 1986, p. 20) in order to understand what J’accepte means when 
telling love and signing his love cards: “make myself illegible for you. J’accepte” (Derrida, 
1987, p. 34). Understanding Derrida and his love is a complex operation, as it challenges 
our ordinary ways of understanding things. What is at stake here is not to understand what 
is hidden behind. There is nothing to be disclosed in Derrida’s text since the secret is told. 
To understand Derrida is not to catch or seize him, to hold together all words his corpus 
consists of, as the Latin formula of understanding [comprehension] would suggest. To un-
derstand the secret is rather to carefully follow the topography of its traces: “I’m talking 
about conscious secrets, carried by what is known, as known, and not about the unconscious 
one, no one has yet said anything about the secret as known” (Derrida, 1993, p. 78).  
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